

# TRIGGERFLOW

Regression Testing by Advanced Execution Path Inspection

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# Outline


- ▶ Analysis subject: OpenSSL
- ▶ Triggerflow
- ▶ Finding bugs using it

# OpenSSL

- ▶ Industry standard cryptographic library
- ▶ Has timing leak problems
- ▶ Countermeasures in place but not perfect

# Timing leaks

- ▶ Some cryptographic operations execution time heavily depends on arguments
- ▶ Can guess the ballpark of a number by watching the time
- ▶ Critical operations are padded to counteract this
- ▶ CT and non-CT function variants, for security or speed




# Timing leak countermeasure

- ▶ A flag (true/false variable) set on big numbers to ensure they are handled in constant time
- ▶ Requires both proper setting and proper handling
- ▶ Several bugs have been discovered in its usage:
  - ▶ CVE-2016-2178 (flag not propagated)
  - ▶ CVE-2016-7056 (flag not set)
  - ▶ CVE-2018-0737 (flag not set/set wrongly/not checked)

```
struct bignum_st {  
    BN_ULONG *d;    /* Pointer to an array of 'BN_BITS2' bit chunks. */  
    int top;        /* Index of last used d +1. */  
    /* The next are internal book keeping for bn_expand. */  
    int dmax;      /* Size of the d array. */  
    int neg;       /* one if the number is negative */  
    int flags;     /* # define BN_FLG_CONSTTIME 0x04 */
```

## Tracking down non-constant time operations on sensitive data

- ▶ Set up a breakpoint in debugger and run the program
- ▶ Prone to false positives
- ▶ This is the full graph of code paths leading up to certain non-CT codepaths in OpenSSL



# Triggerflow demo

- ▶ Now, live application of Triggerflow will be demonstrated

# Triggerflow

- ▶ Runs specified commands while watching execution paths
- ▶ Written in Ruby, uses GDB for execution tracking
- ▶ Works with any GDB-supported language
- ▶ Not restricted to OpenSSL or constant-time analysis, could be used to detect execution of any kind of interesting code
- ▶ Open source, MIT license
- ▶ <https://gitlab.com/nisec/triggerflow>

```
## DSA: generate parameters (not secret)
```

```
exec openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DSA -out dsa.params <...>
```

```
## DSA: generate private key
```

```
debug openssl genpkey -paramfile dsa.params -out dsa.pkey
```

```
exec cat dsa.params dsa.pkey > dsa.pem
```

```
## DSA: sign
```

```
debug openssl dgst -sha512 -sign dsa.pem -out lsb-release.sig data
```



# Triggerflow rules

- ▶ Allows advanced rules like ignoring codepaths

```
/* code before */
if(a % 2 == 0) // TRIGGERFLOW_POI
/* code after */
if(something) {
    a = publickey; // TRIGGERFLOW_IGNORE_GROUP ec_publickey
}
call_suspicious_code(a) // TRIGGERFLOW_IGNORE_GROUP ec_publickey
/* code before */
call_suspicious_code(a) // TRIGGERFLOW_POI_IF a.private()
/* code after */
int call_suspicious_code(int a) {
    // TRIGGERFLOW_POI
    /* something interesting with a */
}
call_suspicious_code(public_key) // TRIGGERFLOW_IGNORE
```

## Triggerflow result example

- ▶ With TF markup, we can restrict output by ignoring false positive paths




Figure: Detected flows without ignoring false positives





Figure: Only interesting flows

## Bug found: projective to affine

- ▶ Placing an annotation in `int_bn_mod_inverse` uncovered an unsafe execution path from ECDSA
- ▶ Function turned out to be constant-time flag unaware
- ▶ Replaced with CT-safe code along with some refactoring
- ▶ <https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8254>



## Bug found: BN\_CTX retaining flag

- ▶ Interestingly, previous issue was introduced by seemingly unrelated commit
- ▶ Sometimes BN\_CTX, a persistent storage for BNs, passed flag to a new BN
- ▶ 15yo defect resulted in obscuring SC issues
- ▶ Fixed by explicitly resetting constant time flag
- ▶ <https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8253>

```
@@ -227,6 +227,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx)
    }
    /* OK, make sure the returned bignum is "zero" */
    BN_zero(ret);
+   /* clear BN_FLG_CONSTTIME if leaked from previous frames */
+   ret->flags &= (~BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
    ctx->used++;
    CTXDBG_RET(ctx, ret);
    return ret;
```

- ▶ We have established a continuous integration system, watching active OpenSSL branches for some known vulnerable operations
- ▶ <https://gitlab.com/nisec/openssl-triggerflow-ci>

NISEC > openssl-triggerflow-ci > Pipelines

All 421 Pending 0 Running 0 Finished 421 Branches Tags Run Pipeline

| Status              | Pipeline                   | Triggerer | Commit   | Stages |                                |
|---------------------|----------------------------|-----------|--|--------|--------------------------------|
| <span>passed</span> | #66200059 (#421)<br>latest |           | 🔗 master ↔ 8ba28910<br>🌿 Updated openssl to 6597d62... | 👍      | 🕒 00:13:38<br>📅 27 minutes ago |
| <span>passed</span> | #66196420 (#420)           |           | 🔗 master ↔ a6b636dd<br>🌿 Updated openssl to b1d14c4... | 👍      | 🕒 00:13:46<br>📅 48 minutes ago |
| <span>passed</span> | #66192230 (#419)           |           | 🔗 master ↔ 5438153c<br>🌿 Updated openssl to 02f209b... | 👍      | 🕒 00:13:03<br>📅 1 hour ago     |

# Scope

- ▶ Dynamic analysis
- ▶ Source code required
- ▶ Scanning for known problems

# Thank you!

Links:

- ▶ <https://gitlab.com/nisec/triggerflow tool>
- ▶ <https://gitlab.com/nisec/openssl-triggerflow-ci> OpenSSL CI



Figure: Triggerflow software package



Figure: NISEC twitter